The Fire from which Morality Burns

I teach a number of Ethics courses each semester. These courses are very enjoyable for me, and I hope for my students as well.  Each time I introduce an ethical theory I look for its foundational principle: its central proposition from which it determines the rightness or wrongness of particular actions. For instance, Libertarians ground all of their determinations about what is right and wrong in a principle of self-ownership, Deontologists in a list of universal moral rules, Utilitarians in the greatest amount of happiness that can be produced, Human Rights Theorists in some list of basic rights.  

The problem with all of this is that it is terribly abstract. Traditional moral theories propose a solution to the problem or right and wrong that fails to take into account the genuine motivation behind human goodness. Conceiving of morality as something like a math problem to be solved by the dry and impersonal calculations of reason, such theories forget that our our initial impulse toward acting morally is concern for and empathy with our fellows.

Compassion for others (be they human or animal) is the fire from which morality burns. The reason we strive to be good is that we care about others. We desire to help them, to keep them from harm, to accord them the same treatment we would like for ourselves. Without this initial compassion for others, the spark of morality fails to ignite and considerations or right and wrong are not possible.

Consider the activities of the most deranged among us: Do mass shooters, serial killers, and other sociopaths care for others? Clearly they do not. Could the SS guards have had compassion for their Jewish prisoners? The American slave-owners empathy for their slaves? Perhaps there was a flicker here and there, but without ignoring, repressing, or just plain not having the natural impulse to feel for others pain and rejoice with them in their happiness, they could not have acted in the reprehensible and inhuman manner that they did.

The origin of morality is feeling, not reason. Furthermore, it is not feeling for humanity in the abstract, but feelings for others that we actually encounter, that we actually have relationships with, that creates morality. Unless we start here, until moral theories take as their departure the central role of feelings and relationships in creating morality, we cannot hope to provide a satisfactory account of right and wrong.

This is not to say, however, that reason is irrelevant or unimportant to morality. Reason is extremely important, It is not enough to feel compassion, we must think out how best to demonstrate our compassion. We will encounter conflicts in our relationships with others and we need reason to manage them.

We cannot figure out how to act morally without reason. But reason cannot provide the initial burst that makes us moral. Without a feeling of solidarity with others, reason is a cold, calculating tool; capable of helping the Nazi gleefully persecute his victims or the serial killer calmly stalk his prey.

Where the feeling of compassion and solidarity with others is absent, there can be no morality. When it is present, there must be.

Should we Boycott the NFL?

Can a moral person continue to watch professional football? I have wrestled with this question of late. The prevalence of brain damage from head injuries is well documented, and with the recent death of Junior Seau linked to brain disease caused from injuries I am forced to admit that my entertainment comes at the expense of the health, well-being, and even life of these players.

I know the obvious reply: They choose to play the game, knowing these risks. If they choose to play it, then it's fine to watch them. But this simply will not do. I am not suggesting that we make football illegal, or censor it on TV, or even that we tell others to stop watching. I am asking myself, and asking my readers to ask themselves, if it is morally appropriate to derive enjoyment from watching others risk so much damage to themselves.

That these players choose to play football knowing the risk, does not mean we are innocent for watching. When a person is objectified, their dignity ignored, their pain made part of our entertainment, we have done something wrong to them, whether they consent to it or not. This is the kind of argument one often hears against going to strip clubs or watching pornography. When one engages in these activities one treats a fellow human being as if they were a mere "thing," and object existing solely for our satisfaction. If that argument applies to exotic dancers and pornographic actors, then it seems to apply to professional athletes just as well. And in this case, we are watching these men play a game that seriously threatens their well-being and health.

On the other hand, every profession and every sport carries risks. Sometimes those risk are severe. These men do know the risk and they apparently think it is worth the sacrifice. Furthermore, every time any person renders us a service we use them as a "thing." I doubt we are seriously meditating on the dignity and passion and rights of our garbage collectors, waiters, and other such persons. We do not and cannot always refrain from such behavior.

But this is not a matter of simple player choice. Most NFL players make a few hundred thousand a year and only play for a few seasons. Few of these players get high paying jobs after they retire and they are not given health care by the NFL. Furthermore, the NFL does not take necessary and relative simple steps to insure player safety.

This means that the NFL itself is exploiting its players for financial benefit. Their bodies are ruined and they are then left discarded and abandoned. All this simply to make a profit for billionaire owners. (returning to the analogy with porn and strip clubs: it is precisely this exploitation of individuals who are often emotionally damaged that is the real objection to pornography, not simply their getting naked and being sexual for the enjoyment of others)

So it is not a matter of simply knowing that these players chose a dangerous sport and they can get hurt. That is a choice one can make, and I see no problem being entertained by a game that makes those choices. But the abandonment of its players by the NFL is unacceptable.

Perhaps morality does require that we stop watching the NFL until the league treats its players as it deserves? On the other hand, the NFL is so wildly popular and so profitable that one can scarcely imagine sufficient outrage to affect a change. Does this mean we should just throw in the moral towel and enjoy the game?

I will be thinking about this very carefully during the off season.

Why it is Morally Wrong to Vote for Paul Ryan

I believe that Paul Ryan's political views are deeply immoral. Because of this I will cast my vote against Mitt Romney and his VP this November. I guess this makes me a values voter of a short; albeit a liberal one. 

Of course anyone who knows me or this blog knows that I was always going to vote Obama in 2012. So this post is not really about me, it's about the role that morality does, and should, play in our voting choices.

Many Americans have long held to the troubling position that our personal values and moral concerns should be separated from how we vote and who we vote for. This has never really been the case. If we are honest with ourselves, then we know that we cannot vote against our conscience, against what we think matters. Furthermore, why on earth would we wish do so? Why would we leave our convictions outside the voting booth.

The right wing has understood this for a long time. The left has but slowly and recently become aware of it. But this November the choice of values is sharp and clear.

Mitt Romney has chosen Wisconsin Republican Paul Ryan for his running mate. Ryan is best know as the author of the Ryan Budget. This budget deprives the poor of medicaid and food stamps, the elderly of medicare and social security, and in general cuts funding to all forms of aid for poor and middle class Americans, apparently for the sole purpose of giving more tax cuts to the super wealthy.

As Robert Reich explains,

Ryan’s views are crystallized in the budget he produced for House Republicans last March as chairman of the House Budget committee. That budget would cut $3.3 trillion from low-income programs over the next decade. The biggest cuts would be in Medicaid, which provides healthcare for the nation’s poor – forcing states to drop coverage for an estimated 14 million to 28 million low-income people, according to the non-partisan Center for Budget and Policy Priorities. 

Ryan’s budget would also reduce food stamps for poor families by 17 percent ($135 billion) over the decade, leading to a significant increase in hunger – particularly among children. It would also reduce housing assistance, job training, and Pell grants for college tuition. 

In all, 62 percent of the budget cuts proposed by Ryan would come from low-income programs. 

The Ryan plan would also turn Medicare into vouchers whose value won’t possibly keep up with rising health-care costs – thereby shifting those costs on to seniors.
At the same time, Ryan would provide a substantial tax cut to the very rich – who are already taking home an almost unprecedented share of the nation’s total income. Today’s 400 richest Americans have more wealth than the bottom 150 million of us put together.

We are , then, presented, first and foremost, with a choice of what we want government to be. Should government work to improve the lives of its citizens, to provide for our basic needs, to help build community, to educate, enlighten, and strengthen civil society, or should government be used as a tool to aid and abet the wealthy few as they hoard more and more of the economic pie?

If you appreciate government roads, public parks, libraries, and rules and regulations that protect you from shady business practices, if you think education is a right and that our schools should be well funded, if you think the elderly are entitled to basic health care, and the unemployed and starving help for their basic needs, then you must vote against Paul Ryan.

Ryan sees the government as a tool to be crafted for the good of rich men like himself. If we stand against that, if we really think government ought to be used to help all people and build a strong and healthy society, then we are morally obligated to cast a vote against Paul Ryan and Mitt Romney this election day.

Should someone be inclined to believe Ryan's claim that his goal is to reduce the deficit, the New Yorker Magazine quickly kills that myth:

Ryan was a reliable Republican vote for policies that were key in causing enormous federal budget deficits: sweeping tax cuts, a costly prescription-drug entitlement for Medicare, two wars, the multibillion-dollar bank-bailout legislation known as TARP. In all, five trillion dollars was added to the national debt

In other words, Ryan's budget has nothing to do with reducing the deficit. It would not do so in any case. The best way to reduce the deficit would be large cuts to military spending and big tax hikes on the super wealthy. Ryan directly opposes both. His real goal, therefore, is crystal clear: helping the filthy rick hoard even more wealth.

The role of government, however,  is not the only value forced to the forefront by the Ryan pick.

If we believe that women have the right to determine their own reproductive choices, if we believe that they are fully equal with and entitled to the same dignity as men, then we cannot, in good conscience, vote for Paul Ryan. Mr. Ryan is steadfastly for that set of policies and positions that some call "the war on women." If Ryan had his way employers would be free to refuse women coverage for their birth control on the flimsy and bogus grounds of "religious freedom," and states could force women to have trans-vaginal ultrasounds.

Finally, Paul Ryan is a poster boy for those who refuse to see gays and lesbians as equal to those who are straight. Not only does Ryan oppose same-sex marriage, he opposes allowing gay people to adopt, voted to keep "Don't ask, Don't tell," and refused to support anti-hate crime legislation. Those of us who support our homosexual fellows and their full equal rights and dignity must oppose this man.

There are other issues that are just as morally disturbing: From his "A" NRA rating on guns - which in light of recent shootings in Colorado and in Ryan's home State of Wisconsin, is particularly perverse -, to his desire to arrest women who have abortions; from his desire to repeal "Obama-Care," to his strong support for Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker's destruction of that State's unions, there is scarcely any position held by this Social Darwinist that does not demand that we respond by stating our moral convictions with our vote.

The choice is clear. If you believe government should ensure a fair playing field and a basic standard of living for all, if you believe gay and lesbian people and the love they have for each other should be respected, if you believe that women are human beings with full dignity who have every right to control their reproductive faculties, then you are morally obligated to vote against the Romney/Ryan ticket, and, therefore, to vote for Obama,

If, on the other, hand you are going to vote for Romney and Ryan, then admit to your moral positions. When you vote for them, you vote for a government that exists to make the richer richer at the expense of every one else. A vote for this GOP ticket is a vote that says that women are not really equal to men, that gays and lesbians are sinful and bad, and that people do not have a right to health care, social security, or basic aid when they fall upon hard times.

That is the choice. It is a moral decision.

That Catastrophic Spider Immanuel Kant

Nietzsche once remarked that Immanuel Kant was a Catastrophic Spider. By this he meant that Kant's moral Philosophy sucked the life out of human beings. I suppose today we might refer to Kant as a "vampire" hence the image I have placed here of Nosferatu resembling the sage of konigsberg.

It is not hard to see why Nietzsche thought this. For Kant all our personal drives, goals, and inclinations must be sacrificed to an abstract and absolute duty. This is even worse then it sounds. Kant makes it quite clear that if we do good deeds out of natural inclination our actions have no moral worth. We must act, Kant asserts, out of a pure respect for duty; it is not enough to do our duty, we must do it simply because it is our duty. No other reason has moral worth.

Kant uses two examples to illustrate his bloodless claim that we must act for the sake of duty alone. First, Kant explains - one can almost hear the stern Prussian lecturing and imagine him wagging his finger at us - that a person who is naturally kind and charitable toward others (the "friend of humanity" Kant calls him) cannot be morally praised. He is good to others because his character is kind. This will not do, he is acting out of inclination, not a purely rational sense of duty.

Kant then asks us to consider a man of "cold temperament" a genuine misanthrope who has no desire to do good for others, but makes himself do so out of sheer duty. This man's actions have moral worth. He is, for Kant, a moral hero. In much the same vein, Kant would be forced to say that loving parents who raise their children well out of natural affection cannot be morally praised, but hateful parents who despise their children and yet strive to do right by them for the sake of duty alone are morally commendable!

Something has surely gone wrong here. Kant acts as though our character, the kind of person we are, is not something for which we can be morally praised. On the contrary, he argues that a good character seems to prevent us from being authentically moral. An impoverished theory if there ever was one.

Can any one honestly believe that we are only moral to the extent that we act against our character and inclinations? This is perverse! Surely who we are matters at least as much as what we do.

To see just how impoverished Kant's morality is check out the correspondence between Kant and Maria Von Herbert. That entire correspondence with scholarly commentary can be found here. The gist of the conversation is as follows. Von Herbert wrote Kant explaining that she was seriously contemplating suicide but knows from reading Kant that suicide is not morally permissible.

As the correspondence continues, we see that Von Herbert is chronically depressed. She writes:

My vision is clear now. I feel that a vast emptiness extends inside me, and all around me - so that I almost find my self to be superfluous, unnecessary. Nothing attracts me. I'm tormented by a boredom that makes life intolerable. Don't think me arrogant for saying this, but the demands of morality are too easy for me. I would eagerly do twice as much as they command. They only get their prestige from the attractiveness of sin, and it costs me almost no effort to resist that.

The commentator notes that Kant is here confronted with a Kantian moral saint. The woman has no passions and therefore simply acts out of a concern for duty alone. In a very telling passage Von Herbert wonders if Kant himself is as empty and lifeless as she is:

I beg you to give me something that will get this intolerable emptiness out of my soul. Then I might become a useful part of nature, and, if my health permits, would make a trip to Kñnigsberg in a few years. I want to ask permission, in advance, to visit you. You must tell me your story then, because I would like to know what kind of life your philosophy has led you to - whether it never seemed to you to be worth the bother to marry, or to give your whole heart to anyone, or to reproduce your likeness. I have an engraved portrait of you by Bause, from Leipzig. I see a profound calm there, and moral depth - but not the astuteness of which the Critique of Pure Reason is proof. And I'm dissatisfied not to be able to look you right in the face

Kant, unable to see this woman as anything other than a "crazy lady," dismisses her letters and refuses to respond. Ten years later she finally did commit suicide. I concede that Von Herbert is not really the "perfect Kantian" she has no passions to master. For Kant an act appears to be moral to the extent that we have mastered our natural passions which run contrary to this. But her chief motivation is duty, and her lack of passion poses no problems for a Kantian. For Kant must, in the end, regard our natural impulses and desires as something we would be better off without. Maria Von Herbert lacks these impulses and desires and the result is chronic depression. She rightly sees that Kant's philosophy pushes us all in that direction. This is a very serious problem.

Kant's total failure to see, in this woman, a profound criticism of his philosophy as lifeless is damning. I would not, however, consider it worth the bother of a blog post if this were just about Kant.

Throughout his work Kant stressed that he is simply the philosophical spokesmen for common sense morality. I fear he is right. Kant's cold, impersonal, and inhuman ethics are the logical conclusion of a very common conception of what morality is. Many of us think of morality as essentially prohibitive. It is a set of external commands that, more often than not, forces us to oppose our natural impulses and normal inclinations, that demands we obey regardless of our happiness or well-being. Kant builds his theory with the dreadful consistency of a math problem on just this conception.

One need not reflect all that deeply to see that this conception of morality and the moral life is the spider Nietzsche said it was. An ethic that makes enjoyment and character, well-being and fulfillment the enemy of duty is a sick one.

Whatever the proper theory of ethics is, this is not it.

We must think again.